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Abstract
The technique of imaging was first introduced by Lewis (1976), in order to pro-
vide a novel account of the probability of conditional propositions. In the intervening
years, imaging has been the object of significant interest in both AI and philosophy,
and has come to be seen as a philosophically important approach to probabilistic
updating and belief revision. In this paper, we consider the possibility of generalising
imaging to deal with uncertain evidence and partial belief revision. In particular,
we introduce a new logical criterion that any update rule should satisfy, and use
it to evaluate a range of different approaches to generalising imaging to situations
involving uncertain evidence. We show that none of the currently prevalent ap-
proaches to imaging allow for such a generalisation, although a lesser known version
of imaging, introduced by Joyce (2010), can be generalised in a way that mitigates
these problems.
1 Introduction
Standard Bayesian epistemology tells us that upon learning some new piece of
evidence, E, a rational agent should update their beliefs via Bayesian conditionalisa-
tion, i.e. P1(A) = P0(A|E) should hold for any other proposition A (where P0 is the
probability distribution representing the agent’s prior belief state, and P1 represents
their belief state after learning E).1 The alternative technique of Imaging was first
introduced by Lewis in his seminal Probabilities of Conditionals and Conditional
Probabilities (Lewis, 1976). Its introduction was motivated mainly by the need for a
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1P (A|E) denotes the conditional probability of A given E, defined by P (A|E) := P (A ∧ E)/P (E)
(where P (E) > 0).
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new account of the probability of conditionals. In particular, Lewis’s famous trivial-
ity results are often taken to show the untenability of ‘Adam’s thesis’, which states
that for any conditional proposition A → B, we should set P (A → B) = P (B|A),
i.e. the probability of the conditional is the conditional probability of the conse-
quent given the antecedent. Lewis considered the possibility that when assessing
the probability of a conditional, we should not conditionalise on the antecedent, but
rather we should ‘image’ on it. Before we see the definition of ‘imaging on A’, we
briefly introduce some formal notation.
W will denote the set of possible worlds, and WA will denote the subset of W
that satisfies A (for any sentence A). µ will denote a ‘measure’ on the powerset
P(W ) that assigns a weight µ(X) ∈ [0, 1] to each subset X ⊆ W . We require that∑
w∈W µ({w}) = 1 and µ(X) + µ(Y ) = µ(X
⋃
Y ) whenever X
⋂
Y = ∅. We then
set P (A) =
∑
w∈WA µ(w) (it is easy to see that P will be probabilistic). Finally,
for any sentence A and any world w, σ(A,w) is defined to be the closest possible
world to w at which A holds (where ‘closest’ is defined by a similarity relation
S : W ×W → [0, 1]).2 For now, we assume that σ(A,w) picks out a single closest
A-world, for each w. We define the result of ‘imaging on A’ as follows,
µA(w) =

µ(w) +
∑
w′∈W¬A|w=σ(A,w′)
µ(w′), if w ∈WA
0, if w ∈W¬A.
The idea is that, when we learn A, we should update our probability assignment by
transferring the probability of each ¬A-world to the closest A-world. As Lewis puts
it:3
“Intuitively, the image on A of a probability function is formed by shifting
the original probability of each world w over to σ(A,w), the closest A-
world to w. Probability is moved around, but not created or destroyed,
so the probabilities of worlds still sum to 1. Each A-world keeps whatever
probability it had originally, since if w is an A-world then σ(A,w) is w
itself, and it may also gain additional shares of probability that have been
shifted away from ¬A worlds. The ¬A worlds retain none of their original
probability and gain none. All the probability has been concentrated
on the A-worlds. And this has been accomplished with no gratuitous
movement of probability. Every share stays as close as it can to the
world where it was originally located.” (Lewis (1976): 310–311)
It’s easy to see4 that imaging and Bayesian conditionalisation can give very different
answers as to how an agent should update their epistemic state in the face of new
2Intuitively, the similarity relation measures the similarity between pairs of worlds in W .
3We have edited the formal notation in the quote so that it accords with our own.
4Lewis gives the following example. Let µ0(w1) = µ0(w2) = µ0(w3) = 1/3. Let A hold at w1 and
w2, but not at w3, and let w2 be the closest A world to w3. Then, while conditioning on A would give
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evidence. However, both approaches can claim to provide the ‘minimal’ revisions to
the original probability functions that satisfy the new constraints implied by learning
A. Thus, we read:
“Imaging P on A gives a minimal revision in this sense: unlike all other
revisions of P to make A certain, it involves no gratuitous movement of
probability from worlds to dissimilar worlds. Conditioning on A gives a
minimal revision in this different sense: unlike all other revisions of P
to make A certain, it does not distort the profile of probability ratios,
equalities and inequalities among sentences that imply A.” (Lewis (1976):
311)
Since its introduction, imaging has gone on to be used in a variety of contexts,
both technical and philosophical. For example, Joyce (2008) and Lewis (1981) use
general imaging (a variation on the ‘standard’ form of imaging that will be in-
troduced later) to formulate key aspects of causal decision theory, Cozic (2011)
proposes a solution to the Sleeping Beauty problem by replacing conditionalisation
with imaging, artificial intelligence researchers have used imaging to address fun-
damental problems in the field of information retrieval (Crestani, 1998), Leitgeb
(2016) recently applied imaging to probabilistic judgement aggregation, and there
are even empirical studies suggesting that (general) imaging is the best current for-
mal model of the way that people actually go about updating their belief states
in the face of new evidence (Baratgin & Politzer, 2011). Cumulatively, this looks
like sufficient grounds for taking imaging seriously as an approach to probabilistic
updating. However, it has been argued (see e.g. chapter 6 of Joyce (2008)) that
imaging rules are fundamentally different to the updating mechanisms of Bayesian
epistemology, in the sense that they are not genuinely ‘evidential’, i.e. they do not
preserve the antecedently known evidence. Proponents of this kind of view typi-
cally construe imaging as a method for counterfactual belief revision. While it is
impossible to conditionalise on a proposition that we know to be false (because the
corresponding conditional probability is undefined), it is possible to image on an
event that we know to be false. So imaging allows us to determine what we would
believe under the counterfactual supposition that a false proposition is true. Here,
we remain agnostic about whether or not imaging rules can only be used to model
counterfactual belief revision. Certainly, the extant philosophical applications of
imaging have gone far beyond counterfactual belief revision, and Lewis and Stal-
naker both treated imaging as a potential approach to evidential updating. But the
considerations discussed here will be of significant interest regardless of whether one
restricts the use of imaging rules to counterfactual belief revision or allows for their
use as evidential updating rules.
us the posterior distribution µ1(w1) = µ1(w2) = 1/2, imaging on A would give us µ1(w1) = 1/3 and
µ1(w2) = 2/3.
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In what follows, we will study how imaging deals with one of the basic problems
facing any probabilistic updating or belief revision rule, namely, the problem of
generalising the rule to deal with uncertain evidence. In Section 2, we introduce a
new criterion that any such generalisation should satisfy, and show that some well
known rules (Jeffrey conditionalisation and Leitgeb-Pettigrew updating) from the
literature satisfy this criterion. In Section 3, we present a range of new formal results
concerning the possibility of extending imaging to uncertain evidential contexts in a
way that satisfies the criterion. Section 4 considers the implications of these results
and concludes.
2 Updating on Valid Arguments
Let Γ ` φ be a valid argument scheme. Usually, we describe this as meaning
that there is no possible world where Γ is true and φ is false, i.e. every Γ-world is
a φ-world. Now let’s suppose that I have some prior belief state represented by the
probability distribution P0. It seems very natural to require that, upon learning the
evidence Γ, my belief in φ should go to 1. And indeed, it is a standard result (see
chapter 3 of Adams (1996)) that this is the case if one updates by conditionalisation.
However, we are more interested in the general case where our belief in Γ increases
without going to 1, i.e. where we only have the constraint that P1(Γ) ≥ P0(Γ). The
idea is that we should require, for any update rule, that in this situation P1(φ) ≥
P0(φ) is guaranteed. The motivation is fundamentally the same as in the special case
where P1(Γ) = 1, i.e. since the truth of Γ guarantees the truth of φ, learning that Γ is
more likely to be true than we previously thought should guarantee a corresponding
increase in the probability of φ being true. This gives us the following criterion:
Definition 1 (Validity Criterion (VC)) Let Γ → φ be an instance of a valid
argument scheme, and let P0 be our prior probability distribution. If R is our
update rule and we learn the evidence Γ with probability γ ≥ P0(Γ)5, then the result,
P1, of updating P0 according to R should guarantee that P1(φ) ≥ P0(φ).
We know that valid arguments lead us from true premises to true conclusions, which
means that certainty about the premises should guarantee certainty about the con-
clusion. But it seems clear that we also want to be able to use valid arguments
to support conclusions based on uncertain premises. Indeed, if this were not the
case, one could reasonably ask “What is the value of logical validity if we are in
the business of making inferences with uncertain premises?”. Given the ubiquity of
arguments based on uncertain premises in both scientific and everyday reasoning,
5Whenever Γ is a set of more than one formulae, we use P (Γ) to denote the probability of the
conjunction of all the formulae in Γ.
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this is an important question, and VC ensures that we are able to answer it satis-
factorily. We now show that VC is satisfied by two of the most important update
rules from the current literature.
2.1 VC and Jeffrey Conditionalisation
Jeffrey conditionalisation is the natural extension of standard Bayesian condi-
tionalisation to situations involving uncertain evidence. Specifically, if we learn some
new evidence E with probability e, then the posterior probability of any proposition
A after Jeffrey conditionalisation (henceforth JC) on E is defined to be
P1(A) = P0(A|E)P1(E) + P0(A|¬E)P1(¬E)
= P0(A|E) e+ P0(A|¬E) (1− e) .
It is easy to see that, in the case where e = 1, this reduces to standard condition-
alisation. JC is by far the most popular rule for updating in the face of uncertain
evidence, and we take it to be one of the strongest arguments in favour of Bayesian
conditionalisation that it generalises so naturally to uncertain contexts. The fol-
lowing result adds to the already substantial body of considerations supporting the
adoption of JC as one’s updating rule for uncertain propositional evidence. (All
absent proofs are in the Appendix.)
Proposition 1 JC satisfies VC.
2.2 VC and Leitgeb-Pettigrew Updating
Leitgeb-Pettigrew updating (LP) was first introduced in Leitgeb & Pettigrew
(2010), as the unique update rule that maximises diachronic accuracy (as measured
by the Brier score). Specifically, if we learn some new evidence E with probability
e, LP requires us to update our epistemic state in the following way, where µ1 is
the new measure obtained by applying LP to µ:
µ1(w) =
µ(w) + αE , if w ∈WEmax{µ(w)− α¬E , 0}, if w ∈W¬E ,
where αE and α¬E are the unique real numbers such that∑
w∈WE
(µ(w) + αE) = e∑
w∈W¬E |µ(w)−α¬E>0
(µ(w)− α¬E) = 1− e.
LP has a much shorter history than JC, and is correspondingly less well known.
Its independent justification by arguments from accuracy certainly count in its
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favour, but it has already been subjected to criticism concerning the effect it has
on the likelihood ratios between propositions (see Levinstein (2012)). However, the
following result adds to the rule’s plausibility.
Proposition 2 LP satisfies VC.
3 Imaging Uncertainty
3.1 Standard Imaging
We’ve seen that the generalisation of conditionalisation to uncertain evidence
satisfies our new criterion. The challenge for the proponent of imaging as an evi-
dential update rule is to find a similar generalisation of imaging that also satisfies
VC. First, we note that there is no problem in the special case where we learn the
evidence with certainty. Standard imaging is able to distinguish between valid and
invalid arguments in the special case where we learn the premises with certainty.
But of course we are more interested in the general case where, instead of learning
the premises Γ with certainty, we get some non-maximal increase in the probability
of Γ. Before we can consider this more general case, we need a new form of imaging
that allows us to have 1 > P1(Γ) ≥ P0(Γ). This is something that will require a fairly
different approach, since standard imaging is only defined for the case where we learn
the premises with certainty. Luckily, such an approach already exists (it was first
defined in Sebastiani (1998)). In particular, there is a form of imaging known as
‘Jeffrey Imaging’ (inspired by Jeffrey conditionalisation) that allows us to update on
uncertain evidence. It’s defined below, where P ∗Γ is the new probability distribution
obtained by Jeffrey imaging (JI) on Γ, P ∗(Γ) is the new probability constraint that
reflects our new level of confidence in Γ and µΓ is the measure obtained by standard
imaging on Γ.
P ∗Γ(φ) =
∑
w∈Wφ
(µΓ(w)P
∗(Γ) + µ¬Γ(w)P ∗(¬Γ))
Phrased in terms of the measure on the possible worlds, this gives
µ∗Γ(w) = µΓ(w)P
∗(Γ) + µ¬Γ(w)P ∗(¬Γ).
Clearly, JI is to imaging what JC is to conditionalisation. In the special case
where P ∗(Γ) = 1, JI reduces back to standard imaging, which makes JI the obvious
generalisation of imaging to uncertain contexts. Furthermore, JI appears to be the
only such generalisation currently on the market, which makes its plausibility all
the more crucial for those who advocate imaging as an evidential updating rule.
Note that JI can also be used to generalise the counterfactual belief revision
method given by standard imaging. For, under the standard interpretation, imaging
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on a proposition A that we are certain is false tells us what it would be rational
to believe under the counterfactual supposition that A is true. Thus, imaging tells
us what a rational agent would believe if their degree of belief in A were different
than it actually is (i.e. if it were 1 rather than 0). But this can be generalised in
an obvious way. Rather than simply asking what the agent would believe if their
degree of belief in A were 1 rather than 0, we could likewise ask what they would
believe if their degree of belief in A were a rather than 0, where a ∈ (0, 1). This is
a philosophically rich and interesting question, which has already been the subject
of debate in the belief revision literature (see e.g. Lin & Kelly (2013)). And JI
provides a natural answer that is obtained by generalising the full counterfactual
belief revision given by standard imaging. Furthermore, it seems that VC should
still be taken as a strong normative restriction on generalised counterfactual belief
revision of this kind. For, it seems natural to require of any rational agent that, were
they to be more confident of the premises of a valid argument than they actually
are, they would also be more confident in the conclusion of that argument. Again,
the motivation is the same as before. The premises guarantee the truth of the
conclusion, and so it would seem strange to deny that, were a rational agent to
become more confident of the premises, they would also become more confident
of the conclusion. So regardless of whether one views imaging as a counterfactual
belief revision method or a full blown evidential updating rule, it seems that VC
should act as a normative constraint on any generalisation of imaging to uncertain
evidence/generalised belief revision. Unfortunately, we have the following result:
Proposition 3 JI, as defined above, doesn’t generally satisfy VC.
Proof To see this, let’s consider the example of modus ponens, i.e. Γ = {A →
B,A}, φ = B, W = {w1, w2, w3, w4} where w1 = {A,B}, w2 = {A,¬B}, w3 =
{¬A,B}, w4 = {¬A,¬B}. Here, it is clear that σ(Γ, w2) = σ(Γ, w3) = σ(Γ, w4) =
w1 (since WΓ = {w1}). However, there are two possibilities for σ(¬Γ, w1), since both
w2 and w3 satisfy ¬Γ, and they both differ from w1 by one truth value. Now, suppose
we choose the case where σ(¬Γ, w1) = w2. In this case (setting α = P ∗(Γ)−P0(Γ)),
we have that
P ∗Γ(φ) = µ
∗
Γ(w1) + µ
∗
Γ(w3)
= µΓ(w1)P
∗(Γ) + µ¬Γ(w3)P ∗(¬Γ)
= P ∗(Γ) + µ¬Γ(w3)P ∗(¬Γ)
= P ∗(Γ) + µ(w3)P ∗(¬Γ) (since σ(¬Γ, w1) = w2)
= µ(w1) + α+ µ(w3) (1− µ(w1)− α)
= µ(w1) + α+ µ(w3)− µ(w1)µ(w3)− αµ(w3).
So, since P0(φ) = µ(w1) + µ(w3), we know that
P ∗Γ(φ)− P0(φ) = α− µ(w1)µ(w3)− αµ(w3),
7
which is clearly negative for large values of µ(w3) and small values of α.
So, we’ve seen that, in its current form, JI fails to satisfy our new criterion.
Now, the obvious way to fix the problem is to require, in the above example, that
σ(¬Γ, w1) = w3, since this implies that
P ∗Γ(¬φ) = µ∗Γ(w2) + µ∗Γ(w4)
= µ¬Γ(w2)P ∗(¬Γ) + µ¬Γ(w4)P ∗(¬Γ)
= µ(w2)P
∗(¬Γ) + µ(w4)P ∗(¬Γ) (since σ(¬Γ, w1) = w3)
≤ µ(w2) + µ(w4)
= P (¬φ).
But of course, the key assumption that σ(¬Γ, w1) = w3 looks ad-hoc and unjustified.
What’s more, this assumption guarantees that the argument works for any value of
α. Indeed, α could even have been negative and the probability of φ would still have
been guaranteed not to decrease. So as well as being ad-hoc, this assumption seems
to trivialise the evidential relationship between the conclusion and the premises of
valid arguments. This looks like a fundamental problem for JI.6
3.2 General Imaging
We can now consider another possible amendment to JI that one might hope
would allow it to satisfy the criterion. The technique of standard imaging has
been generalised (Gardenfors, 1982) to allow for cases where σ(Γ, w) can be a set of
worlds, instead of just a single world. Specifically, the technique of ‘general imaging’
is defined as follows. First, for any pair of worlds w,w′ and any proposition E, we
define the value TE(w
′, w) ∈ [0, 1] (satisfying ∑w′∈W TE(w,w′) = 1). Intuitively,
TE(w,w
′) tells us what percentage of µ(w) will be transferred to w’ after we image
on E. In the case where w |= E, we will have TE(w,w′) = 0 for any w′ 6= w, and
TE(w,w) = 1. Similarly, we can view standard imaging as the special case where,
for any E and any w, there exists exactly one w′ such that TE(w,w′) = 1, and
TE(w,w
′′) = 0 for any other w′′. But we are more interested in the general case
where there can exist w′ 6= w′′ such that TE(w,w′) > 0, TE(w,w′′) > 0. Then, we
can set
µE(w) =

µ(w) +
∑
w′∈W¬E |w∈σ(E,w′)
µ(w′)TE(w′, w), if w |= E
0, if w |= ¬E
6It should also be noted that the proof of Proposition 3 assumed very little about the semantics of the
conditional. For, it seems entirely uncontroversial, under any account of the semantics of conditionals,
that w1 is the only one of the four worlds according to which both A→ B and A hold. We also take it
to be uncontroversial that w2 violates A→ B. And this is all that is assumed in the proof.
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This is the formal definition of ‘general imaging’. Now, as with standard imaging,
we can use this definition to define a direct analogue of JC. In particular, we define
JI in exactly the same way as before,
µ∗Γ(w) = µΓ(w)P
∗(Γ) + µ¬Γ(w)P ∗(¬Γ).
But here, it is understood that µΓ denotes the result of general imaging on Γ,
rather than standard imaging. Now, we can look again at the question of whether
JI satisfies VC. Let’s start by recalling the case of modus ponens. The situation
looks more hopeful this time since we don’t need to transfer all of the probability
from w1 to exactly one of w2, w3 (we’ve already seen that either of these choices is
unsatisfactory) when we image on ¬Γ. Rather, we can now spread the probability
between w2 and w3 however we like. One natural idea here is to adopt the following
principle:
Definition 2 Worldly Indifference (WI) Let w ∈W , and let Γ be some non-empty
set of propositions such that w |= Γ. Then,
µΓ(w) = µ(w) +
∑
w′∈W |w∈σ(Γ,w′)
µ(w′)
|σ(Γ, w′)| .
That is, we require that the weight of any non-Γ world gets distributed evenly
across all of the maximally similar Γ worlds when we image on Γ. In the current
case of modus ponens, this requires that µ¬Γ(w3) = µ(w1)/2 + µ(w3) and that
µ¬Γ(w2) = µ(w1)/2 + µ(w2), i.e. TE(w1, w2) = TE(w1, w3) = 0.5. Before we go on
to see what effect this assumption has on JI’s relation to VC, it’s worth noting that
it looks very intuitive from a philosophical perspective. At first blush, there is no
obvious reason why either w2 or w3 should gain the lion’s share of w1’s probability.
They are both equally similar worlds (from w1’s perspective) that are compatible
with the proposition that we’re imaging on (¬Γ). However, we have the following
result:
Proposition 4 Assuming WI, JI does not satisfy VC.
Now, one might want to play around with variations of WI to see if there is
some other way of distributing the probability of w1 so that VC isn’t violated. We
now present a general result about the possibility of such variations.
Theorem 1 There is no general imaging rule that allows for the satisfaction of VC
by JI.
So JI violates VC for both standard and general imaging. At this stage, JI looks
dead in the water as a strategy for extending imaging to updating in uncertain
evidential contexts or performing generalised counterfactual belief revision of the
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type described in Section 3.1. However, there is another alternative that we’ve not
yet considered. In particular, recall the assumption WI. The form of imaging defined
by this assumption has actually already been considered in the literature (Joyce
(2010) refers to it as ‘Laplacian Imaging’). Now, Laplacian imaging actually bears
a very close resemblance to LP.7 Indeed, it is easy to see that Laplacian imaging
coincides with LP when the evidence is certain and we assume that the similarity
relation is the trivial maximal relation,8 i.e. σ(Γ, w) = WΓ for any w ∈W¬Γ. Letting
w ∈WΓ, we get
µΓ(w) = µ(w) +
∑
w′∈W |w∈σ(Γ,w′)
µ(w′)
|σ(Γ, w′)|
= µ(w) +
∑
w′∈W¬Γ
µ(w′)
|WΓ|
= µ(w) +
P0(¬Γ)
|WΓ|
= µ(w) +
α
|WΓ| .
This is exactly the same result we obtain with LP (and by definition, any w ∈W¬Γ is
given a weight of 0 by both µΓ and LP). So, under these restrictive assumptions, LP
can be seen as a generalisation of Laplace imaging to uncertain evidential contexts.
Furthermore, since we’ve already seen (Proposition 2) that LP satisfies VC, we
can claim to have succeeded in finding a generalisation of imaging to uncertain
situations that satisfies our criterion. However, a key part of the original motivation
for imaging has been sacrificed here. In particular, the original argument that Lewis
used to justify imaging was that it involved ‘no gratuitous movement of probability
from worlds to dissimilar worlds’. But this justification is no longer applicable if
we adopt the present strategy, since the present strategy essentially requires us to
surrender any meaningful notion of similarity between worlds. Of course, this is
likely to be unsatisfactory for the advocate of imaging. So we take it that LP
can be discounted as a viable candidate for generalising imaging in the desired way.
However, there is one final alternative form of imaging that we’ve not yet considered.
3.3 Proportional Imaging
Joyce (2010) introduces yet another form of imaging. In particular, working
in the framework of general imaging where σ(Γ, w) can have multiple elements, he
7This is noted in chapter 15 of Pettigrew (2016).
8To see that this assumption is necessary, consider the following example. Let WΓ = {w1, w2, w3}
and W¬Γ = {w4}. Then, if µ(w1) = µ(w2) = µ(w3) = 0.1, µ(w4) = 0.7, σ(Γ, w4) = {w1, w2} and we
learn Γ with certainty, then it’s easy to see that Laplace imaging gives us µΓ(w1) = µΓ(w2) = 0.45,
µΓ(w3) = 0.1, and µΓ(w4) = 0, whereas updating with LP gives us µ1(w1) = µ1(w2) = µ1(w3) = 1/3,
which is what Laplacian updating would give if σ(Γ, w4) = WΓ held.
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suggests that we define (where ¬w |= E)
TE(w,w
′) :=

µ(w′)∑
w′′∈σ(E,w)
µ(w′′) , if w
′ ∈ σ(E,w)
0 if w′ /∈ σ(E,w)
i.e. the amount of w’s probability that gets transferred to any of the closest E-
worlds after imaging on E will be proportional to the prior probability of those
worlds. Note that this approach is fundamentally different to the form of general
imaging we defined above, where we assume that TE(w,w
′) is always independent of
µ(w′). We will call this new form of general imaging ‘proportional Imaging’. Joyce
gives the following justification for proportional imaging as opposed to the other
forms of general imaging,
“. . . it now seems obvious that imaging must involve the combined effects
of judgments of similarity among worlds and prior probabilities. When
the information about similarity runs out and an imager is left with a non-
trivial set of E-worlds that are most like w, she still has excellent reasons
for treating some worlds in this set differently from others.After all, she
began by regarding some worlds in the set as more likely than others,
and her evidence has not changed. Imaging should thus be Bayesianized,
so that probabilities are spread over sets of ‘most similar’ worlds in a way
that preserves the imager’s prior beliefs.” (Joyce, 2010)
Consider the following example. Ettie is wondering what’s for dinner. She knows
that she will either have rice or chips in her meal. She also knows that there are two
possible situations if she’s going to have chips: either she will have fish and chips, or
she will have tofu and chips, but fish with chips is much more likely (since tofu and
chips is a bit strange). For simplicity, let’s say there is only one possible situation
where she gets rice (where she has rice and beans for dinner), and this situation
is, in her humble opinion, equally similar to each of the two situations where she
gets chips. Now, suppose she sees her dad pealing some potatoes, so she knows that
she will be having chips for dinner, not rice. As a staunch advocate of probabilistic
imaging, she will now transfer all the prior probability stored in the rice world to the
two chip worlds. How should she do this? According to Joyce, she should transfer
the majority of the probability of the rice-world to the fish-and-chip-world, since this
is by far the more likely of the two chip worlds. Otherwise, she would risk distorting
the ratio of the probability of her getting fish and chips compared to the probability
of her getting tofu and chips.
To illustrate, suppose she has good reasons for believing that fish and chips is
twice as likely as tofu and chips, and suppose that the probability of the rice world
is 0.4, so µ(TC) = 0.2, µ(FC) = 0.4, µ(R) = 0.4. Then, according to Laplacian
imaging, the new evidence would require her to add 0.2 to each of µ(TC), µ(FC)
to get the posterior probabilities of those worlds, µ1(TC) = 0.4 and µ1(FC) = 0.6.
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But then µ1(TC) 6= µ1(FC)/2. So Ettie no longer thinks that fish and chips is
twice as likely as tofu and chips, which seems wrong, given that she hasn’t learned
anything about the comparative probabilities of these two events. Whereas if she
uses Joyce imaging, she will get
µ1(TC) = µ(TC) +
µ(R)µ(TC)
µ(TC) + µ(FC)
= 1/3
µ1(FC) = µ(FC) +
µ(R)µ(FC)
µ(TC) + µ(FC)
= 2/3,
i.e. µ1(TC) = µ1(FC)/2, i.e. Ettie has successfully updated her probabilities
without unnecessarily compromising the probability ratios of her prior beliefs. This
kind of example makes Joyce’s arguments on the previous page look very convincing.
However, one might be tempted to ask whether this ‘Bayesianisation’ of imaging
does not render the approach equivalent to standard conditionalisation. The follow-
ing example shows that this is not the case. Let WA = {w1, w2}, W¬A = {w3} and
WB = {w1, w3}. Then, if we learn the evidence A and update by conditionalisation,
our posterior probability for B will be
P1(B) = P0(B|A) = P0(A ∧B)
P0(A)
=
µ(w1)
µ(w1) + µ(w2)
.
But now, let’s assume that we have a similarity relation such that σ(A,w3) = {w1}.
Then, according to Joyce imaging, we get
P1(B) = µA(w1)
= µ(w1) +
µ(w1)µ(w3)
µ(w1)
= µ1 + µ3 .
Clearly, the two answers are very different here, and this difference is determined
completely by the choice of similarity relation. Just as LP can be seen as the limit
case of Laplacian imaging where the similarity relation is trivial, conditionalisation
can be seen as the limit of proportional imaging when we assume an indiscriminate
similarity relation. When the similarity relation is non-trivial, we will no longer be
guaranteed to preserve probability ratios, because we will be more concerned with
ensuring that there is ‘no gratuitous movement of probability from worlds to dis-
similar worlds’. But proportional imaging (unlike Laplacian imaging, for example)
still has the advantage that, when these two desiderata are jointly satisfiable, it will
satisfy them both. Furthermore, we will now show that proportional imaging can be
generalised to deal with uncertain evidence in a way that avoids at least some of the
issues described in previous sections. Recall that both standard and general imaging
violated VC even for the simple case of modus ponens, and even once one allows
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for the world w1 to have two closest worlds. This is not the case for proportional
imaging.
Proposition 2 Let W , Γ, φ be as in the proof of Proposition 3 and suppose that
σ(¬Γ, w1) = {w2, w3}. Then assuming proportional imaging, using JI to increase
the probability of Γ will never lead to a decrease in the probability of φ.
So proportional imaging succeeds where standard and general imaging failed.
Given a suitable similarity relation (i.e. one that includes w3 amongst the closest
worlds to w1), increasing the probability of the premises of a modus ponens argument
will never lead to a decrease in the probability of the conclusion. This result is
an instance of a more general property of proportional imaging, captured by the
following result.
Theorem 3 Let Γ → φ be an instance of a logically valid argument scheme and
let W be such that for any w ∈ WΓ, there exists some w′ ∈ W¬Γ∧φ such that w′ ∈
σ(¬Γ, w). Then assuming proportional imaging, using JI to increase the probability
of Γ will never lead to a decrease in the probability of φ.
Theorem 3 guarantees that, assuming proportional imaging, JI will always satisfy
VC except for in cases where there exists a world w that satisfies the premises of a
valid argument but is such that all the closest worlds to w at which the premises are
false are also worlds at which the conclusion of the argument fails to obtain. Thus,
although JI does not satisfy the validity criterion VC in full generality, we have
at least identified the exact conditions under which the criterion can be violated.
Whereas other forms of imaging will force JI to violate VC in an unconstrained and
ubiquitous way, proportional Jeffrey imaging will only violate VC in special cases
where the similarity relation somehow overrides the evidential relationship between
the premises and conclusions of valid arguments.
4 Conclusion
In summary, we considered the problem of generalising imaging to deal with
uncertain evidential contexts and partial belief revision. We saw that the most
natural such generalisation of the best known forms of imaging from the literature
violated an intuitive logical criterion in a radical way. We then proved that a lesser
known form of imaging (proportional imaging) is better able to satisfy this criterion,
although there are still special cases in which the criterion is violated. We hope to
investigate these cases in further detail in future work. More generally, the results
presented here elucidate a number of important and hitherto neglected structural
features of imaging rules and illustrate the obstacles and possibilities facing those
13
who are interested in generalising imaging to uncertain evidential contexts and/or
partial belief revision.
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A Appendix: Proofs
A.1 Proposition 1
Let Γ ` φ be a valid argument scheme, and suppose we learn Γ with probability
P ′(Γ) ≥ P (Γ), and let α = P ′(Γ)− P (Γ). Then,
P ′(φ) = P (φ|Γ)P ′(Γ) + P (φ|¬Γ)P ′(¬Γ)
=
P (φ ∧ Γ)
P (Γ)
P ′(Γ) +
P (φ ∧ ¬Γ)
P (¬Γ) P
′(¬Γ)
= P ′(Γ) +
P (φ ∧ ¬Γ)
P (¬Γ) P
′(¬Γ)
= P (Γ) + α+
(
P (φ ∧ ¬Γ)
P (¬Γ)
)
(P (¬Γ)− α)
= P (Γ) + α+ P (φ ∧ ¬Γ)− αP (φ ∧ ¬Γ)
P (¬Γ) .
So,
P ′(φ)− P (φ) = P ′(φ)− P (Γ)− P (φ ∧ ¬Γ)
= P (Γ) + α+ P (φ ∧ ¬Γ)− αP (φ ∧ ¬Γ)
P (¬Γ) − P (Γ)− P (φ ∧ ¬Γ)
= α− αP (φ ∧ ¬Γ)
P (¬Γ)
≥ α− αP (¬Γ)
P (¬Γ)
= 0.
A.2 Proposition 2
Let Γ ` φ be a valid argument scheme, and suppose we learn Γ with probability
P1(Γ) ≥ P0(Γ) Again, we set α = P1(Γ)− P0(Γ). Then, we have that
P1(φ) = P1(Γ) + P1(¬Γ ∧ φ)
= P0(Γ) + α+ P1(¬Γ ∧ φ).
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Note that α = αΓ|WΓ|, and α ≥ α¬Γ|{w ∈ W¬Γ|µ(w) − α¬Γ > 0}|. Thus, we have
that
P1(φ)− P0(φ) = P0(Γ) + α+ P1(¬Γ ∧ φ)− P0(Γ)− P0(¬Γ ∧ φ)
= α+ P1(¬Γ ∧ φ)− P0(¬Γ ∧ φ)
= α+
∑
w∈W¬Γ|µ(w)−α¬Γ>0
(µ(w)− α¬Γ − µ(w))
= α− α¬Γ|{w ∈W¬Γ∧φ|µ(w)− α¬Γ > 0}|
≥ α− α¬Γ|{w ∈W¬Γ|µ(w)− α¬Γ > 0}|
≥ 0.
A.3 Proposition 4
In particular, sticking with the modus ponens example, let’s assume the following
initial setup: µ(w1) = 0.1, µ(w2) = 0.05, µ(w3) = 0.8 and µ(w4) = 0.05 (and hence
P0(Γ) = 0.1) with the following constraints: P
∗(Γ) = 0.11 and P ∗(¬Γ) = 0.89.
Then, we have that P0(φ) = µ(w1) + µ(w3) = 0.9 and
P ∗Γ(φ) = µ
∗
Γ(w1) + µ
∗
Γ(w3)
= µΓ(w1)P
∗(Γ) + µ¬Γ(w3)P ∗(¬Γ)
= P ∗(Γ) + µ¬Γ(w3)P ∗(¬Γ)
= P ∗(Γ) + (µ(w3) + µ(w1)/2)P ∗(¬Γ)
= 0.11 + (0.85) (0.89) = 0.8665.
Hence, P0(φ) > P
∗
Γ(φ).
A.4 Theorem 1
Again, we use the example of modus ponens. First off, we let µ1 := µ(w1),
µ3 := µ(w3), α := P
∗(Γ) − P0(Γ) = P ∗(Γ) − µ1 (we know this is positive, by the
assumption that P ∗(Γ) ≥ P0(Γ)), β := µ¬Γ(w3)−µ3 (again, we know this is positive,
by the definition of imaging). Then, we want to show that
P ∗(φ)− P0(φ) ≥ 0.
Now,
P ∗Γ(φ)− P0(φ) = µ∗Γ(w1) + µ∗Γ(w3)− µ1 − µ3
= µΓ(w1)P
∗(Γ) + µ¬Γ(w3)P ∗(¬Γ)− µ1 − µ3
= P ∗(Γ) + µ¬Γ(w3)P ∗(¬Γ)− µ1 − µ3
= µ1 + α+ (µ3 + β) (1− µ1 − α)− µ1 − µ3
= α+ µ3 − µ1 µ3 − αµ3 + β − β µ1 − αβ − µ3
= α (1− µ3) + β (1− µ1)− αβ − µ1 µ3.
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Let’s define the function
f(α, β, µ1, µ3) := α (1− µ3) + β (1− µ1)− αβ − µ1 µ3 .
Now, clearly, this function is decreasing in µ1 and µ3, so to violate the inequality,
let’s set µ1 + µ3 = 1. Then, we have
f(α, β, µ1, µ3) = f(α, β, µ1, 1− µ1)
= α(1− (1− µ1)) + β(1− µ1)− αβ − µ1(1− µ1)
= αµ1 + β − β µ1 − αβ − µ1 + µ21
= (β − µ1)(1− α− µ1).
Clearly, the term on the right is always non-negative, since α+µ1 ≤ 1 (by definition
of α). But the term on the left will always be negative except for the case in which
µ1 = β (we know that β ≤ µ1 always holds by definition of β). So the only case
in which the probability of φ doesn’t decrease here is where µ1 = β, i.e. where we
transfer all of µ1’s probability to µ3. For any other alternative to WI, we can find
values for µ1, µ3, α that violate VC.
A.5 Theorem 3
Setting ew = {w′ ∈ W |w ∈ σ(¬Γ, w′)}, where Γ ` φ is valid, the assumption
(which we will refer to as VA) says that for any w′ ∈ WΓ, there exists some w ∈
W¬Γ∧φ such that w ∈ ew′ (of course, we don’t need to worry about the case in
which every φ world is a Γ world, since in this case the simple assumption that
P1(Γ) ≥ P0(Γ) is sufficient). Next we set
S =
∑
w∈W¬Γ∧φ
∑
w′∈ew
µ(w)µ(w′)∑
w′′∈σ(¬Γ,w′)
µ(w′′)
.
We have
P1(φ) = P1(φ ∧ Γ) + P1(φ ∧ ¬Γ)
= P1(Γ) + P1(φ ∧ ¬Γ)
= P0(Γ) + α+
 ∑
w∈W¬Γ∧φ
µ¬Γ(w)
 (1− P0(Γ)− α)
= P0(Γ) + α+
 ∑
w∈W¬Γ∧φ
µ(w) + S
 (1− P0(Γ)− α)
= P0(Γ) + α+ (P0(¬Γ ∧ φ) + S) (1− P0(Γ)− α)
= P0(Γ) + α+ P0(¬Γ ∧ φ)− P0(¬Γ ∧ φ)P0(Γ)− P0(¬Γ ∧ φ)α+ S(1− P0(Γ)− α).
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So,
P1(φ)− P0(φ) = α− P0(¬Γ ∧ φ)P0(Γ)− P0(¬Γ ∧ φ)α+ S (1− P0(Γ)− α)
= α (1− P0(¬Γ ∧ φ))− P0(¬Γ ∧ φ)P0(Γ) + S (1− P0(Γ)− α).
Clearly, this function is decreasing in P0(¬Γ ∧ φ) and P0(Γ), so setting P0(Γ) +
P0(¬Γ ∧ φ) = 1, we get,
P1(φ)− P0(φ) = αP0(Γ)− P0(¬Γ ∧ φ)P0(Γ) + S(P0(¬Γ ∧ φ)− α).
We now show that S ≥ P0(Γ). First, recall that
S =
∑
w∈W¬Γ∧φ
∑
w′∈ew
µ(w)µ(w′)∑
w′′∈σ(¬Γ,w′)
µ(w′′)
.
Let w′ ∈ Wγ . Then, by VA, we know that there exists w ∈ W¬Γ∧φ such that
w′ ∈ ew, i.e. w ∈ σ(¬Γ, w′). Furthermore, by the fact that w′ ∈ ew and the
assumption that P0(Γ) + P0(¬Γ ∧ φ) = 1, we get∑
w′′∈σ(¬Γ,w′)
µ(w′′) =
∑
w′′∈σ(¬Γ∧φ,w′)
µ(w′′) .
Now, note that
µ(w′) =
∑
w′′∈σ(¬Γ∧φ,w′)
µ(w′′)µ(w′)∑
w′′∈σ(¬Γ∧φ,w′)
µ(w′′)
.
So,
P0(Γ) =
∑
w′∈WΓ
∑
w∈σ(¬Γ∧φ,w′)
µ(w)µ(w′)∑
w′′∈σ(¬Γ,w′)
µ(w′′)
.
And, by another application of VA,∑
w′∈WΓ
∑
w∈σ(¬Γ∧φ,w′)
µ(w)µ(w′) ≤
∑
w∈W¬Γ∧φ
∑
w′∈ew
µ(w)µ(w′) .
This gives us S ≥ P0(Γ), as desired. Thus,
P1(φ)− P0(φ) ≥ αP0(Γ)− P0(¬Γ ∧ φ)P0(Γ) + P0(Γ) (P0(¬Γ ∧ φ)− α)
= 0.
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